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Strategic Management for
Mine Action Operations:
A Case for Government-Industry Partnering
by Dr. Alan Childress and Lieutenant Colonel Pete Owen

Summary
Directed mainly ar policy makers and
leaders in mine-plagued nations and governm ent and non-government mine action
planners, the article argues for holistic mine
action strategies, coordinated priorities, and
best management pract ices. The authors
establish the need for nations ro rake charge
of their min e action organizations and
present strategic management methodology
to implement self-determination concepts.
T hey insist rhar humanitarian demining
must starr with rhe end in mind, an integrated and nationally prioritized requirements analysis of each of the mine action
areas-mine awareness, mine field assessment and su rveys, mine and UXO clearance, victim assistance and information
management. They also suggest rhat nations
should cons ider reconstruction and development programs, as well as mine action,
when contem plating resource mobilization.
With nationally prioritized programs, and
mine action centers managed by host nation -d edicated general managers, nation's
can ex peer ro achieve optimum resource allocation and, most importantly, to look after their people as a first priority. The
author's recommend that nations look to
industry for dedicated, first tier mine action
program managers.

l.lntroduction
By way of introduction we relate Andy
Smith's description of the beginning of a
typical humanitarian demining effort. Ar
present, Smith writes in rhe O ctober 1998
journal of Humanitarian Demining, humanitarian demining in most affected areas
begins wirh a U.N.-led emergency response,
which is controlled by ex-pars, who usually
have a military background and who are
largely paid fo r by 'ear-marked' donations

from U.N. countries. Ar rhe same time, as
rhe U.N. arrives, the specialist charitablyfunded clearance groups, which are funded
by an individual government's aid budget or
by trusts and donor charities, rend to move
into the area. Followi ng rhe charitable
groups come rhe commerc ial companies,
so me of rhem regionally based, wh ile others may appear regionally based bur are acrually initiated by profit-raking outsiders.
Further, while a few new charitably funded
demining groups still exist, most of the new
players are commercial companies. For example, with the massive funding available
for work in rhe former Yugoslavia, Eu ropean
groups are anxious ro get involved and new
allegiances and companies arise weekly.
Our point in relating Smith's scenario
is to highl ight rhe apparent lack of holistic
strategic plan ning and management processes rhar would help coordinate and manage scarce h umanitarian demining resources. Wh ile planners and resou rce suppliers have increased dramatically since rhe
early-90s, we find no apparent corresponding management strategies to coordinate
those planners' and s uppliers' intentions.
Humanitarian demining documents suggest
that governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other donor organizations have entered the demining equation without a n integrating plan to help
synergize their donated resources and have
become immune ro rhe cry for help. Our
experience in humanitarian demining, combined with our research of the human itarian d emi ning management and technology
li terature, reveals that the humanitarian
demini ng industry's customers, the 70 or so
m ine-plagued nations, would benefit greatly
from a general model, a process, to strategically manage their humanitarian demining efforts. In general, our paper is addressed
to the leaders of those m ine-infested na• 66 .

tion s, calling on them to establish clear priorities in relation to the needs of their affected people and to manage the accomplishmenc of those priorities with the most
sophi sticated management practices they
can summon.

2. Literature Review
According to several humanitariandem ining sou rces, landmine clearance will
require decades of organized, deliberate, and
rime-consu ming effo rt. Srudies reveal that
60-100 million land mines lay abandoned in
at least 70 co untries around rhe world and
landm ines arc responsible for killing or
maiming an estimated 500 people each
week. Hidden Killers 1998: The Global
Landmine Crisis reports th e cost ro remove
one land mine averages from $300 to $ 1,000
and the cost for surgical care and fitting of
an artificial limb is $3,000 or more per
amputee in some countries. An additional
problem, Hidden Killers 1998 continues, is
rhe long-rerm effect on people and their
environment. Landmines stand in the way
of efforts ro restore war-torn societies to
normal life. They co nsume billions of dollars of assistance that could be used to bring
prosperity and reconciliation, impacting virtually every aspect of life in the mine-affected countries and on the international
community as ir seeks effective ways to help
those countries. Hidden Killers 1998 concludes, in part, that rhc landmi ne crises can
be successfully overcome, if the countries
sufferi ng mine poll ution are determined to
tackle the problem, and if the international
community can sustain and coordinate its investment (italics ou rs) in eradicating the
landmine plague.
In addition to Hidden Killers 1998, we
found several writers who stress the need for
a comprehensive management approach to
mine actio n operations. We briefly eire rhe

more adamant writers below. Note that we rests wirh individual stares. When rhe stare
replace humanitarian demining with mine is inherently incapable of demining irs land
action , which refers to all those activities this ability must be developed, in which case
that address the problems faced by popula- rhe U.N. assumes rhe responsibility of cations as a resu lt of landmine poll mion.
pacity building. Reviewing U.N. landmine
Retired Ambassado r Roberr Oakley et policy documents, we find the Un ited Naal., arguing in a Los Angeles Times arricle tions Mine Action Service (UN MAS) is inthat international dem ining planners need deed rhe focal point within the U.N. systo develop a comprehensive demining strattem for all mine-related activities, respon egy, suggest rhar rhe international commu- sible for ensuring an effective, proactive and
nity must begin working together now to coordinated U.N. response to landmine
develop an integrated app roach to humani- contam inatio n. UNMAS is tasked with
tarian demining. They asserr rhat all co m- helping to facilitate global efforrs ar coorponents of mine action-mine awareness, dinating mine action. Mine action strategic
m ine assessment and survey, mine and UXO management at rhe country level, however,
clearance, and victim assistance-should be does nor appear an UNMAS function , alintegral pans of any comprehensive inter- though country-level mine action strategic
national demining operation , stating that management could be inferred from
these initial steps were not taken in Bosnia. UN MAS' holistic goals.
International companies, local contractors
Joe Lokey, arguing fo r comparative adand local forces tackled the larger Bosnian vantage economies, suggests rhar marching
m ine problem and they are still at work to- needs and resources and creating public-priday, co mpeting for funding and influencing vate relationsh ips is of paramount im porpriorities. Oakley er al. claim this lack of a tance. He writes in rhe journal ofHumanicomprehensive master plan has exacted a tarian Demining that rhe challenging dyhigh price-human suffering remains, and namic of the last three to five years is rhar
economic ompur is still less rhan half irs with more resources becoming available, the
1990 figure.
challenge has become more complex and
They furrher claim, regarding Kosovo, difficult to manage. Few o rga nizations and
rhar despite the widespread belief that mine activities have much experience managing
clearance is an integral part of post-conflict and executing mine action programs on rhe
peace-building, economic revitalization and scale now necessary. Lokey submits that rhe
sustainable development, there is no agreed U.N. has had a comprehensive role in atmodel for addressing or even coordinating tempting to orchestrate g lobal d emining
these different needs and roles. They con- and related activities. Mine action center
clude rhar to be effective, international m ine management is freq uently U.N.-sourced, alaction planners must develop a comprehen- though rheir mine action center managesive strategy now. Otherwise, the "fighting ment role has been limited by reorganizamay cease, bur the casualties will go on and tions within the U.N. demining offices, reon." We agree with Oakley, suggesting in source real ignments, lack of consensus by
our Implications and Conclusions section the demining community on rhe role of the
that rhe World Bank, U.N., donor nation U.N. , demining funds debates, ere.
and NGO endeavors might be consolidated
Another need for widely accepted and
under a Development Action Center, syn- applied best management practices, accordthesizing their resources to natio nal inter- ing to Lokey, is based on the potential of
ests.
governments, NGOs, and other rel ief agenAccording to David Ahern in a journal cies ro becom e overly dependent on their
ofHumanitarian Deminingarticle, rhe U.N. internal bureaucracies when implementing
has assumed rhe lead in coordinating NGO their mine action policies. Mine action pridemining efforts with those of their own orities are generally different among governfo rces, and rhar o ne of their principles is rhar mental agencies and organizations. Bureauprimary responsibili ty for mine action plans cracies, so metimes called "stovepipes," un• 67 .

dermine the importance of reaming and
process building or improvement and
thwart interagency coordination and cooperation. Th e almost insidious, ever present
"hidden agenda" must be acknowledged as
underlying many mine action discussions
and evaluations.
Perhaps Lokey's m ost imporrant poi nt,
relevant to our argument for centralized
strategic management, is that donors and
other resourcing agencies must recognize the
authority of rhe host nation or their designated representatives. Too frequen tly, developmental activities take on a paternal characteristic that minimizes rhe role of rhe host
nation and reduces their input into decision
making. We suggest later in rhe article how
host nations can achieve a mine action upper hand through indigenous, strategic
ma nagement competencies, led by a professional general manager.
In the Wintergreen Confirence Proceedings Henry Thompson discusses donor in flu ence on safety and productivity in humanitarian demining, based on Bosnia and
Herzegovina scenarios. He presents a model
rhar involves donors early on in rhe m ine
actions processes and ries rhem to safety and
productivity aspects rhroughour rhe mine
action stages. While humanitarian demining
is donor-driven at the macro level, he concludes, ar rhe micro level donors have nor
been adequately accountable for rhe efficiency o r safety of their programs. We agree
with Thompson that donors should play a
key role in humanitarian demining and rhey
should be more active. We're co ncerned ,
howeve r, rhar the host nation must be
equally involved in planning from the beginning in fo rming and implementing irs
humanitarian dem ining strategy. He also
addresses rhe notion rhar demining should
be approached under rhe overall economic
and social development context, a provision
we strongly concur with.
Major Colin King, in a journal ofHumanitarian Demining article, suggests we
study requirements before investing in technology. Supporting Lokey's argument for
host nation participation in rhe mine action
planning process, he argues that there is inadequate communications between the op-

erarional and scientific communities, and
t hat optimizing the process of demining requires much more than rhe development
and incorporation of high technology. It
involves a logical and coherent approach to
well-defined aims.
Two other professionals we consulted
are Donald "Par" Parierno, Director, Office
of Humanitarian Demining Programs, U .S.
Department of State, and Wolfgang
Schussel, rhe Austria Vice Chancellor and
Foreign Minister. Parierno, arguing the U.S.
case, strongly believes char the host nation's
demining authority, ifir exists, must rake responsibility for the management of demining programs so that mine action activities
provide the greatest benefit to the host nation. An established mine action center
should clarify its nation's policies; enforce
demining safety standards; and provide
quality assurance measures. In addition, an
established mine action center would coordinate NGO and international organizat ions' efforrs, helping to avoid duplication,
reduce waste, save time and most importantly, save lives . Speaking for Austria,
Schussel amplifies Parierno, advising that
mine action programs must be of a comprehensive nature, even to the point that they
must be seen as integral parts of comprehensive reconstruction and development programs. We note that this latter point is also
a position of the World Bank, which we discuss in our closing section.
In addition, a strategic management
process would help produce cost-benefit
analyses, generally needed for nations seeking demining financing. According to the
World Bank's policy document on Mine
Action Programmes, the high cost of financing land mine clearance activities should
also be justified on economic grounds, taking into account the scarcity of financial
resources. In this regard they note a significant aspect of mine action which needs attention is the integration of mine pollution
information into the process of planning for
other sectors in development and reconstruction. Mine pollution affects the comparative expense and value of differing strategies for repair of roads and infrastructure,
rehabilitating agricultural production and

other areas of reconstruction. Because
demining money and development and reconstruction money have often been compartmentalized, trade-offs are not uniformly
made. National leaders, in our view, should
be able to examine all assistance initiatives
concurrently and openly, helping prioritize
their nation's crises from a well-informed
knowledge base.
One other poim we would make: Can
the existing international political and donor level of awareness be maintained?
Patierno (in a 1999 commem in a State
Department road show solici ting private
money for humanitarian demining purposes) warns chat donor fatigue at some
poim is going to set in among donor nations. We need to conserve and distribute
mine action resources for the long term, anticipating that public and private sector focus, awareness, and vigilance may wane over
rime. Nurturing the humanitarian demining constituency over the long term may be
less complicated if mine infested nations can
presem cemralized, responsible, well managed mine action centers that report incremental progress on a consistent basis.
Finally, we note a currem appalling
situation that amplifies our plea for holistic
strategic management. James East reports
char mine-infested Thailand signed rhe Ottawa Agreement, compelling the Thai military to earnestly start mine removal on rhe
Thai-Cambodian border. However, the
agency set up to do it, the Thai Mine Action Centre, has nor yet started conducting
surveys to determine where the mines are.
East quotes the Centre's frustrated assistant
director, "we have been here for a year and
we have not yet removed one mine" even
though U.S. military experts trained the
Thais in mine action when the Centre was
established. The Centre's 150-person staff
awaits HK$20.1 million budget approval
from the Defense Ministry. The 99 trained
deminers are "twiddling their thumbs in
their barracks," according to East, despi te
American pledges to help in financing mine
detecting dogs, mine detectors and armorplated vehicles. This indicates that while
U.S. training was successful, retraining may
be necessary soon (demining skills tend to
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wane if not used) due to the Mine Action
Centre's lack of an integrated or holistic
approach to their mine problems.

3. The Mine Action Strategic
Management Process Defined
Strategic management, in our context,
expresses a commitment to identifying, prioritizing, and implementing the optimum
mix of available mine action resources for a
given mine-plagued nation. The key to strategic management, which is a process, is
recognizing that the resource equation to
address mine problems will most likely differ from one mine-infested geographic or
political area to another. That is, mine action resource mixes, no r constant, must be
tailored to the environment and an evaluation of rhe host nations' ability to sustain a
long-term commitment.
Our strategic management process
starts with the end in mind-a host nationled, U.N. or NGO-supported Requirements Analysis of the mine-infested environment-then works back examining all
resources available to help achieve the host
nation's mine action goals, irrespective of
mine action agendas not indigenous to the host
nation.
The first part of strategic management
focuses on a clear understanding of the host
nation's vision, goals and objectives and an
understanding of what other donors will
bring to the table. The host nation, in developing its strategic plan with the help of
the lead donor, selects the optimum mix of
available mine action resources based on a
requirements analysis of the mined environment. All components of mine actionmine awareness, mine field assessment and
surveys, mine and UXO clearance, victim
assistance, and information managementmust be examined in the requirements
analysis and reflected in the resource mix.
The resource mix (requirements) selected
for employment is based on host nation
goals and objectives, and written into their
strategic plan that details the support they
require from donors.
The second part of the strategic management process is implementing the strategic plan (the resource mix), through a cy-

clical process of planning, orgamzmg,
resourcing, controlling and sustaining the
mine action program. It's not enough to
develop rhe optimum resource mix. To fully
exploit it, host nations must effectively and
efficiently manage the application of those
resources, through a national mine action
cemer, to achieve their mine action visions.
We believe that obtaining or developing an
independent, host nation-dedicated, sophisticated general manager to manage the mine
action center for the long term is as important as developing the strategic plan. Indeed,
it is part of it and we will address this challenge in our concl usions.

4. Strategic Management Process
Applied
In this section we discuss our two-parr
model, the strategic planning phase followed by the implementing management
cycle.

Strategic Planning Phase
We suggest host nations start by studying the contaminated areas concurrently
with establishing a mine action center organization. Typical questions that might be
asked during the strategic planning phase
are: Has a National Level One Survey been
considered? What types of mines are present
or suspected? Casualty data? What is the soil
content? The foliage? The culrure of the
people in the mine pollured region? What
is the land used for? Urgency of mine clearance? Economic implications? Political considerations like can the nation sustain mine
action and is the government able to support long a long-term commitment? What
type of equipment is employed and what is
irs condition?
Relative ro the mine action organization, will the military and civilian sectors
cooperate, with the civilian sector leading
the policy decisions and the military implementing? This is generally a condition for
U.N., World Bank, and NGO support.
What is the structure of their existing humanitarian demining organization? What is
their demining experience?
Seeking an optimum resource mix for
the country, the host nation should build a
requirements matrix for each of the five

components of mine action-minefield
analysis and survey, mine awareness, mine
and UXO clearance, victim assistance, and
information management-for each mineinfested region, then aggregate the data in
a national matrix. The matrix, based on a
Levell survey if available, will help the host
nation decide their approach ro each mineinfected region.

Management Model

leading to goal accomplishment.
For example at our organization, U.S .
Central Command, when we enter a nation
that has sought U.S. mine action assistance,
the planning matrix (similar to a schedule)
we use is designed ro help stand up the new
organization and reach the host nation how
tO manage their humanitarian demining operations. T he matrix we construct is relatively simple, listing the activities required
to stand-up the organization on the left side
and dates across the top (usually in months).
Then we start filling in what should be done
and by whom. This approach works best
wi th new start programs. (Once the host
nation has the MAC and humanitarian
demining committee operational, we work
to support their goals and assist them with
resolving their most significant p roblems
through a train-the-trainer process and donated material and equipment.)
Two significant U.S.-led events occur
during the Planning phase that might also
serve as examples. Following the Department of State Policy Assessment Visit, which
determines U.S involvement in a nation's
request for demining assistance, we begin
developing the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Country Plan. This plan, which we draft
in continuous coordination with the host
nation, mine action trainers, et al., serves as
our resourcmg strategy.

Our thesis is that mine-plagued nations
can and must manage all aspects of their
mine action challenges-mine awareness,
minefield assessment and surveys, mine and
UXO clearance, victim assistance, and information management-by coordinating
and cooperating wi th donors and other
players in the demining industry. Only in
this manner can they synthesize and
synergize human, material, and funding resources ro achieve timely and effective solutions ro mine threats. While not advocating a one size fits all management plan, we
challenge mine action planners to apply best
management practices to achieve the optimum use of scarce resources. We suggest a
6-part management cycle, which we tailored
to help mine action leaders establish a mine
action management process. The cycle involves planning, organizing, resourcing,
controlling, and sustaining, all wired together by coo rdi nation (Figure 1). We rely
on UNMAS for mine action organization
It is written to accurately capture all
terminology and standards.
resources and direct them toward the required support of the host nation. This plan,
Plan
which
helps eliminate redundancy, identiPlanning implements the strategy discussed above and starts with the general fies high-demand military training assets,
manager or minister-in-charge determining and helps coordinate the myriad activities
the goals (or targets) that must be achieved carried our by different U.S. organizations.
to reach the national leader's mine-free vi- It defines the host nation's mine problems
sion. Following goal establishment is defin- and requirements as well as the U.S. coming measurable objectives necessary to mitment. We suggest Mine Action Center
achieve those goals. The general manager (MAC) general manager's develop a similar
may next want to establish and schedule the resourcing holistic plan, in particular to
activities necessary to accomplish the objec- depict resource requirements of their countives. The planning process actually starts try, for budgeting purposes of NGOs and
while performing the Requirements Analy- other donors.
sis that indicates the resources needed to
accomplish the mine action goals. The Requirements Analysis document (we recommend the matrix form) is the guide used to
plan and schedule the objectives and events
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Organize
Developing rhe organization to establish and support the mine action center and
humanitarian demining committee organizations will largely determine successful ex-

ecurion of the plan. How do we arrange ou r
human resources to best accomplish the objectives we set our while planning? Also, defining processes is extremely importanth ow does work ger done at rhe nationa l
MAC and regional MACs? Among donors
within the MAC?
We recognize many aspects of"organizing." The host nation establishes their national humanitarian dem ining Committee,
nati onal MAC, and regional MACs. The
donors and donor comm ittee organ ize d onor support to best address host nation requirements, problems and needs and the
U.S. organizes its support to provide irs part
of the required support. In our case we write
and coord inate our Country Plan and ensure that our planned support compliments
and sy nergizes rhe host nation assets and
dono r support to the host nation. If a military-only organ ization exists, we will recommend so me sort of a civilian-led , military
implemented hybrid organization that all
donors can support.
If so me sort of donor organization is
nor in place, we attempt to organize one to
faci li tate future support and to better coordinate efforts. Parr of our Requi re ments
Determi nation Sire Survey (actually a require ments analysis) is designed to determine who is doing w hat in the host nation,
who has the lead , and where the U.S. firs in
the big pictu re (our aim is a viable self-sufficient program.) This also includes helping
organize donor support to the host nation.

Resource
Resourcing provides funding and personnel to support the MAC and RMACs
and should be coordinated while developing a Cou n try Plan. Based on the Requirements Analysis, all aspects of the mine actio n p rogram must be considered in the resource plan, providing donor organizations
not al ready part of the nati on's demining
plans an opportunity to fill in needed funding or resource gaps.
At U.S. Central Command, we start
resource plann ing in ea rnest during the Requirements Determin ation Sire Survey
while we're con ferri ng with the host nation
and NGOs interested in help ing the host
na tion. We then draft the U .S Co untry

Plan, staff it with all interested agencies incl uding the host nation, then brief the coordinated draft plan to host nation representatives, U.S. humanitarian demining
program managers a nd force providers
(trainers) for a pproval. The briefing is cond ucted at what is called a Resource Allocation Planning Meeting. The end resu lt is a
resourcing plan (the Co untry Plan) that is,
again , techni cally approved by the multiple
humanitarian demining organizations and
the host nation (although not yet sign ed).
The agreed upon plan is then signed by the
U.S. Ambassador to the host nation and
sent ro the decision authority within th e
U.S. government to provide resources. U.S.
resources are approved th rough the Interagency Working Grou p, which represents
u pper-level decision-makers from several
U.S. Government agencies. In the event that
app roved resources are less than required,
the plan is reworked to account for shortages a nd coordinated once more with all
involved agencies supporting humanitarian
demining, including especially the host nation, to help eliminate shortfalls.

Control
We would caution general managers
regarding establishing control measures for
demin ing operations. Evidence suggests that
control systems produce rwo kinds of invalid d ata: invalid data about what can be
done and invalid data about what h as been
done. Military deminers, perhaps unsophisticated in the role of accurate data, may wish
to please their organizatio ns more th an reporting data accurately. Q uality Assurance
ma nagemen t (systemic qual ity) should be
practiced through rigorous demining training and strictly enforced safety practices.
Q uality Assu rance, in addition to Measures
of E ffectiveness, are techniques we would
recom mend host nations establish for controlling quality and reporting progress, thus
helping ensure effective and consistent U.S.
and other donor support. Regarding the
importance of reporting progress, we reiterate here the necessity of M ine Action Centers reporting incrememal progress on a
consistent basis.
In general, the U.S. does not attempt
to control the host nation mine action pro-
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gra m. Accounting procedures are established and cover everything from accounting fo r equipment to the quality of the instruction being conducted in any of the elements of mine action . Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are established for measuring rwo things - how well the host nation
is conducting humanitarian demining and
how well the U.S. support is assisting the
host nation. These MOEs are often d ifferent from the host nation's or other donor's

Mine Action Strategic Management Process figure 1

S. Conclusions and Implications

Measures of Effectiveness. The general m anager must gather the appropriate information to assess MOEs and adjust his program
as necessary to sustain and improve U.S. and

a. Wh ile we suggest that strategic planning for mine action is distinct from m an• MAC, RMAC-Ievel
agement planning, in practice management
• Implements National Strategy
leaders generally combine the functions• Goals and Objectives
thus, the Strategy would be developed in the
• U.S. ROSS event, Co untry
Planning
phase of the management cycle.
Plan started
We made the distinction to emphasize the
importance of determ ining a country's to......
tal m ine action requ irem ents before
contemplating resources, which most
• Formalize p lan
cou ntries tend not to do. Our Strategic
•
Donors
integrated
Management logic would also apply to
Importance can't be overstated
•
Processes
defined
cou ntries that decide to outsource thei r
Involves all players
• U.S. PDSS event
mine actio n operations. Host nations
Synergize MAC
should
lead the Requirements Analysis
Synthesize resources
and
provide
a general manager to lead
phase
U.S. RAPM
their Mine Action Centers. Host nations
Donor committee established
wou ld do well to advertise their general
m anagement needs to international ma nagement cons ultant firms. The investme nt
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Coordination

other donor support.

•
•
•
•
•

Sustain
We repeat Patierno's warning that donor fatigue at some point is going to set in
among donor nations. General manager's
need to conserve and distribute mine act ion
resources for the long term, anticipating that
public a nd p rivate secto r foc us, awaren ess,
a nd vigi lance may wane over time.
In th is phase, the U.S. focus changes
from inte nsive, daily support of the new
organ ization to maintain ing, consulting and
looking more long term for new technologies and tech niques that m ight help sp eed
efficiency and improve safety for the host
nation. Our presence is scaled back to 3045 days per quarter, usually focused on specific elements of mine action such as mine
awareness. For example, our mine action assistance program co nsists of a fo rmal annual
visit called the Requirements and Verification Visit specifica lly designed to review and
update the host nation's hum anitaria n
d em ining requirements, what the oth er donors are doing, a nd the n verifying that
equipment previously donated is being used
properly and effectively. Obviously, we
spend cons iderable time in the hosr nation
throughout the year bur the Requirements
Analysis Verification Visit is conducted to
work with the highest levels of the host nation government and to ensure the host
nation u nderstands we hold them responsible for the supplies and equ ipment provided. The results of the Requirements
Analysis Ve rification V isit a re then used to
update th e Country Plan, changing or

tions-may be the general managers' greatest challenge.

Control
• Q A first, QC second
• U.N. safety standards
• MOE fo r country, donors

•

Figure 1
•
•
•
•

modifying U.S. support ro the
host nation in light of the status of
their goals and objectives as well as
w hat other donors intend to provide. O ur
Country Plans cover rwo years and are coordinated with all agencies associated with
humanitarian demining in the host nation
(including the host nation). U.S. Country
Pla ns are posted on th e web at www.
centcom.mil.

Coordination
In our view, coordin atio n in mine action is continuously communicating within
and amon g all p layers associated with the
host nation's mine action program, to include players who may have a contribution
bur are unaware of it. Reinforcing the holistic approach, coordination starts from day
one an d never stops- it is the key to efficiency and success. Coord ination brings the
p layers ro the table to ach ieve the h ost

n ation's demining vision and helps
break down bureaucratic "stovepipes." Coordination is central to the
five management steps discussed
above. In situations where there are competing desires and agendas between donors and
the host nation , vigorous and op en coordination is absolutely critical.
In our program, the establishment of a
formal donor committee and good lines of
comm unication with rh e host nation is essential. The donor committee must be
chaired by an organizatio n that can help
ensure all donations support the host nation
with minimal redundancy o r waste. The
donor committee provides the forum for coordinating donor p lans and de-conflicting
resource arguments. Coordination is rhe key
to success! Managing coordination within
the MAC- indeed, ach ieving a degree of
cooperation among the mine action func-

• 71 •

ROSS is Requirements Determination Site Survey
PDSS is Pre-deployment Sire Survey
RAPM is Resource Allocation Planning Meeting
RAW is Requirements and Verification Visit

in an exceptional general manager, beholden
only to the host nation government, should
achieve significant returns on the investment, in terms of humanitarian and reso urce allocation outcomes.
b. T he implications of well planned
and host nation -managed mine action programs are considerable, including servi ng
the host nations' political, economic, as well
as mine action agendas. Arnold Sierra, a
Foreign Service Officer currently engaged at
the U.S. Stare Department's Humanitarian
Dem ini ng Program, suggests that host
nation's consider an umbrella Development
Action Ce nter (DAC), w hich would integrate mine action and national development
and reco nstruction act ivities, supporting
self-determination goals. A donor support
methodology could be established with in
the DAC to help eliminate waste, synergize
donor support, a nd coordinate activities by

the many different donor agencies involved.
We note that as a development agency the
World Bank supports member country programs rhat help lead ro rhe eradication of
poverty and to the promotion of sustainable
development. Its support of mine acrion is
based upon the recognition rhat mine pollution is, for many affected countries, a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of
normal development activities. In this context, it shares with UNDP a perspective
which views mine pollution as a development problem with long term consequences
and, necessari ly, with long-term solutions
which extend far beyond initial humanitarian concerns. Also important is that the
Bank shares responsibility with UNDP for
convening donor groups in reconstruction
situations and thus has a major role in resource mobilization and in setting long term
agendas for international support for mine
action and other needs. Similar to UNDP
mine action policies, land mine clearance in
Bank-financed projects must be carried out
under the auspices of civilian authorities, an
incentive for civil ian-led national Mine Action Committees, setting policy for Mine
Action Centers.
c. Impl ications for continuous Quality
Assurance, not necessarily Quality Control,
are significant. While Quality Control ar the
demining un it level is necessary and important, Quality Assurance, systemically managed by the general manager, is equally important. Assuring that training and safety
systems are well designed, properly taught
and rigorously enforced is a fu nction of the

general manager, not off-handedly delegated
to subordinates. In addi tion, iris the responsibility of the general manager to establish
Measures of Effectiveness for his Mine Actio n Center, which tell his boss or the Prime
Minister how the mine action program is
progressing. Donors will also need data for
their own agendas, which the general manager must acco mmodate if he expects continuous donor support. Having established
its own Measures of Effectiveness, the U.S.
will assist general manager's in establishing
data collection methods to meet their (and
other donors') data needs. The point is that
general managers need to realize the importance of regularly reponing mine action data
to donors, helping ensu re their long-term
support.
d. As we suggest throughout this article, our research and experience indicates
that worldwide mine action remains fragmented and un coord inated. Holistic national approaches to their mine action problems would appear to help sustain stable and
generous donor support. Regarding competition fo r demining resources, holistic approaches may tend w prioritize donor supporr w regions enduring the most human
suffering, rather than those with rhe most
political influence.

An Application of Strategic
Management and Lessons Learned
In the June edition of journaL ofMine
Action the authors will demonstrate their
strategy and management model th rough a
fi ctional nation that contains many of the

mine action problems in existence today.
They wi ll also present an organizational
model and several of the lessons they learned
during t heir experience in Horn of Africa
and Middle East mine afflicted countries.
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destructive testi ng, signal/image processing, remote
sensing, Geographic Information Systems and medical imaging.

Existing vs. new technologies
Several national demining campaign sponsors
brought up rhat less emphasis should be put o n development of new technologies. The "improvement
of existing technology will resolve rhe problem faster."
Some prefer an imperfect technique whose limitations
are well-known as compared w a new technique rhat
is not yet trusted. The need for complete solutions,
raking into account all aspects was stressed by many
NGOs - Mine Action is indeed nor only about
demining.

(Global) R&D trends
Much of the R&D effort for hu man ita rian
demining has gone toward the detection of individual
mines. Two approaches seem to be the most predominant: rhe use of a multi-sensor system, or the co mbinati on of a detection sensor. Some research is currently done on wide-area confi rmation methods. Airborne mine field delineation or explosive vapor/trace
detection ro co mplement-or partially replacedogs, in order to save precious rime by concentrating on areas which really need to be demined. Evolution should be governed by a set of keywords
(N PA): "Safer, Faster and Cheaper."

Sensor technology maturity
Consider: we have to rely on indirect evidence
due to the absence of well-established definitions of
equipment performance; most of the results of independent performance tests are not publicly ava ilable;
we have not conducted performance tests ourselves;
and we do not share the practical experience of
deminers working in the field. We nevertheless think
rhat Table 2 is useful in fixing the large tendencies in
tech nology maturity and equipment cost.

Airborne mine field detection/remote sensing
The role of remote sensing vs. ground-based
methods has not yet been fu lly identified. For airborne mine-field detection on realistic surfaces (I 00to 1000-km 2), terabytes (1000 gigabytes) of digital
data have to be analyzed. Setting-up a measurement
campaign is a complex and expensive operation. Although for civilian applications on-board processing
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might not be a primary requirement, even off-line
analysis requires huge computing fitcilities. The development of remote sensing systems has been primarily done in the military context and iris unlikely
char these systems will be operational for civilian applications in the near fu ture. Several platforms have
been tested, like airships, aircrafrs, drones and helicopters. The privileged sensors are the optical and the
IR imager, although UWB-SAR seems to yield promisi ng results for the future. On certain soil types and
non-densely vegetated areas the airborne mine field
delineation results are reported to be successful (e.g.
deserts).

Testing and evaluation
T he implementation of specifications for resting
protocols is again an international miss io n. T he existence of several ad hoc protocols is a well-known
fact after this survey, but they remain proprietary
information, which is inaccessible for th e research
community. In order to rest or compare new technologies that are in the development phase or have
been developed, a possibil ity should exist to gain confidence by application in the field. The establishment
of a joint working group, focusing on rhe development of testing methodologies and the design ofstandards for sensor and system assessment, is currently
o ngoing. On the European side, the existing Committee of Advisors: Detection of Mines based on
Operational Standards (CADMOS) workgroup, promoted by JRC, acts as the core group.
EUDEM started in December 1998 and ended
in July 1999. The survey was conducted by EPFL
(Ecole Polyrechnique Federate de Lausanne) and
VUB (Vrije Universiteit Brussel). It was funded by
EU; DG XIII. •
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